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ABSTRACT
Financial privacy is an extremely important issue for governments,
businesses, and individuals, both in the United States of America
and around the world. The importance of this issue in the United
States today is well illustrated by the unusually large amount of
legislation that has been passed or is currently pending in this
area. Perhaps the most important and comprehensive federal
financial privacy law is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB Act').
Some other important pieces of legislation that cover financial
privacy include the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA '), the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACT'), the Health
Information Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA '), and
Section 326 of the Patriot Act. All of these laws have brought
about significant discussion and litigation but likely none more
than the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The GLB Act is an evolving
piece of legislation. In the year 2005, case law developments have
helped clarify some issues under the GLB Act, but it has also
complicated others. These issues include: whether there is a
private right of action under the GLB Act; how to handle the
conflicts between the privacy rights created under the GLB Act and
the need for disclosure during discovery in litigation; and what
state laws may be preempted under the GLB Act and other
financial privacy laws. In addition, proposals for an amendment
currently pending in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate, if passed, could significantly reshape financial privacy
law. This article will clarify these developments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial privacy laws and the changes in them merit significant
attention because they affect a large range of interests from individuals
to large financial corporations. If public opinion is any indication,
these laws are likely to increase in relevance and number. Americans
are increasingly becoming concerned with their privacy. This trend is
displayed in the results of public opinion polls compiled by the
"The author is a J.D. candidate at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, class of
2007. He earned his B.S. in political science with University Honors from Carnegie Mellon
University.
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Electronic Privacy Information Center.' These polls also show that
Americans favor government-enacted legislation over self-regulation
to protect their privacy rights.
In numerous polls listed below, Americans report the current
self-regulatory framework is insufficient to protect privacy.
A February 2002 Harris Poll showed that 63% of
respondents thought current law inadequate to protect
privacy. A June 2001 Gallup poll indicated that two-thirds of
respondents favored new federal legislation to protect
privacy online. A July 2001 Markle Foundation study
concluded that 64% favored rules to protect consumers on
the Internet, and 58% reported that self-regulation wasn't
enough to ensure adequate accountability. A March 2000
Business Week/Harris Poll found that 57% of respondents
favored laws that would regulate how personal information
is used. In that same poll, only 15% supported self-
regulation.
2
In recent years, it seems that Congress has agreed with the public's
call for federal regulation and a number of financial privacy laws have
been passed.3
Financial Privacy laws cover a broad spectrum of privacy related
topics. The most prominent of these includes Section 326 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, which "provides stricter mechanisms to combat money
laundering domestically and abroad."4  In addition, the "Fair Credit
Reporting Act ('FCRA') and the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act ('FACT Act') attempt to protect the consumer
against legitimate and growing harms such as identity theft." 5 Finally,
1 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Public Opinion on Privacy,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2006).
2 Id. (quoting headers).
3 Steven Robert Roach & William R. Schuerman, Jr., Privacy Year in Review: Recent
Developments in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Other Acts
Affecting Financial Privacy, 1 ISJLP 385, 386 (2005).
4 id.
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Congress has passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which "support[s]
the sharing of information between institutions while protectin
consumer information through disclosure and notice requirements."
In a recent decision, issued on October 4, 2005, Judge Morrison C.
England Jr. of The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California summed up the purpose of these laws:
In FCRA, FACTA and GLBA, Congress created a statutory
framework that seeks to strike a balance between providing
citizens affordable financial services while protecting them
against invasions of privacy and the misuse of personal
information.7
This article will focus on the GLB Act.
II. THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act can be found in titles twelve and
fifteen of the United States Code.8 This law works as a part of the
larger framework of privacy laws discussed above.9 It was passed to
"to enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing
a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms,
insurance companies, and other financial service providers." 10  A
proponent of the law has given the following assessment:
By establishing a three-way street whereby banks can offer
securities, insurance, and other financial products, and
securities firms and insurance companies are authorized to
offer banking products, the legislation puts the consumer in
6id.
7Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, No. Civ. S 04-0778 MCE KJM, 2005 WL 2452798, *1 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 5, 2005).
8 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in Titles 12
and 15 of the United States Code).
9See generally Roach & Schuerman, supra note 3.
10 Julia C. Schiller, Informational Privacy v. The Commercial Speech Doctrine: Can the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Provide Adequate Privacy Protection?, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
349,355 (2003); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-434 (1999).
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the driver's seat. By legislating a prudential framework in
which these financial products can be offered, Gramm-
Leach-Bliley ensures that the banking system remains
independent and sound, credit is provided to all segments of
America, and consumers and their personal financial
information are protected."
The GLB Act is perhaps the most important piece of financial privacy
legislation as it "contains the most comprehensive financial privacy
provisions of any federal legislation ever enacted.' 12 The background
of the GLB Act and current developments in its enforcement and
interpretation are discussed in this article.
A. BACKGROUND: THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
The GLB Act was passed in 1999.13 It was signed into law by then
President Bill Clinton. 14  The GLB Act "repeal[ed] sections of the
Glass-Steagall Act, a New Deal regulation that had restricted
affiliations between commercial banks and securities firms."' 5 Banks
and financial institutions are now allowed to engage in a number of
activities that they were previously forbidden from participating in
including merging with insurance companies and stock brokerages.'1
Lifting these barriers lowers costs for individuals and institutional
organizations. "With such barriers lifted, financial institutions can
effectively satisfy all a customer's investment needs at a lower net cost
than would otherwise be available, due in large part to the ready access
the affiliated entities have to the various customers' personal and
" James A. Leach, Introduction: Modernization of Financial Institutions, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L.
681, 684 (2000).
12 Roach & Schuerman, supra note 3, at 387.
13 Christopher Wolf, 2005 Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 828 PLTIPAT 761,765
(2005).
14 Roach & Schuerman, supra note 3, at 387.
15 Wolf, supra note 13 (citing Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N. C. BANKING INST. 1, 1-2 (2000)).
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financial information."' 7 This unprecedented access to information
does pose privacy concerns.1
8
Consumers would have a lot to fear if financial institutions were
given access to volumes of consumer information without restriction.
If consumers were not provided with some form of protections, they
could be subjected "to a heightened risk of unwanted solicitation,
credit fraud, and identity theft." 9 Privacy advocates have successfully
petitioned Congress for limits on the use of nonpublic personal
information. 20  Such curbs on the use of this nonpublic personal
information are built into the GLB Act.
The privacy provisions of the GLB Act are located in Title V (the
Financial Privacy Law).21  Within this framework there are two
separate subtitles. "Subtitle A creates new substantive obligations
relating to the disclosure of customers' nonpublic personal information
by financial institutions to nonaffiliated third parties." 22 The GLB Act
and the regulations issued pursuant to the act require financial
institutions to "implement procedures to ensure the confidentiality of
personal information and to protect against unauthorized access to
such information. '23  In addition, under the GLB Act financial
institutions must provide customers with notice annually regarding:
"1) the institutions' policies on protecting nonpublic personal
information, and 2) the institutions' policies regarding the disclosure
of nonpublic personal information with affiliated and non-affiliated
entities."
24
The second important provision of Subtitle A of Title V is the
"opt-out" provision. Under 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1) (1999), prior to
disclosing financial information, financial institutions must provide
their customers and certain other consumers with a chance to "opt-out"
17 id.
18 id.
19 Id.
20id
2 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000).
22 Roach & Schuerman, supra note 3, at 387 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (1999)).
23 Wolf, supra note 13, at 766.
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of the disclosure of some specified information to third parties. 25
However, even if a customer affirmatively "opts-out," the institution
can still share information in some limited situations. For example:
"the [financial] institution may disclose a customer's information as
part of the sale of its business, or where the disclosure is necessary to
effectuate a certain transaction requested by the customer., 26 Finally,
"opting out" does not prevent the disclosure of information "to credit
reporting agencies to certain regulatory agencies or when otherwise
required by law. ' 2
7
The other important privacy-related provision of the GLB Act is
Subtitle B of Section V. Subtitle B was enacted to thwart so called
"information brokers" who obtain customer information to defraud the
customers themselves and financial institutions.28 Subtitle B creates
"new federal criminal penalties relating to the fraudulent obtainment
of customer information from financial institutions. 2 9  These
provisions encompass the main privacy topics in the GLB Act, but
who is covered by these provisions?
The privacy provisions of Section V of the GLB Act apply to
"financial institutions." By the language of the GLB Act, "financial
institution" is defined as "any institution the business of which is
engaging in financial activities as described in section 4(k)" of the
Bank Holding Company Act.30  Financial activities are defined by
section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act to include "[e]ngaging
in any activity that the [Federal Reserve] Board has determined, by
order or regulation that is in effect on November 12, 1999, to be so
closely related to bankinA or managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto." In addition, through authority granted to it
by the GLB Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
25 Roach & Schuerman, supra note 3, at 388.
26 Wolf, supra note 13, at 766.
27 id.
28 Roach & Schuerman, supra note 3, at 388.
29 Id. (citing L. Richard Fischer, Disclosure of Nonpublic Personal Information, THE LAW OF
FINANCIAL PIVACY, 9.02 SUBTITLE A (A.S. Pratt & Sons 2004); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821-6827
(1999)).
30 15 U.S.C. § 6809 (2000).
31 Wolf, supra note 13, at 767-768.
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System has issued regulations for financial holding companies and
non-bank affiliates to expand the definition of "financial institutions"
to include a number of entities that are not traditionally considered
financial entities.32 The language of the bill and enforcement actions
by agencies have spurred some litigation. While not every fight has
been hashed out, there are three categories of institutions or
professionals for which we have a clear ruling as to whether they are
covered. The courts have determined that credit reporting agencies are
covered by the GLB Act.3 3  Credit counseling services are also
covered by the GLB Act.34 Finally, the courts have said that lawyers
are not included in the term "financial institutions," and therefore not
covered by the GLB Act.35 This background of the GLB Act allows us
to now examine the parts of the framework that are in flux.
B. 2005 CASE LAW SUMMARY
In 2005, the major case law developments concerning the GLB Act
focused on three major areas. The first, and perhaps most important, is
preemption of state laws by federal financial privacy law. The second
involved the conflict between the protections created by the GLB Act
and the need for disclosure during discovery. The last major issue
handled by the courts concerned whether a private right of action is
created by the GLB Act.
1. STATE LAW PREEMPTION
One of the most heavily litigated areas of law involving the GLB
Act is the preemption of state law. Specifically, some states have tried
to enact laws that they felt were complementary to or tougher than the
relevant federal laws. "The states passing stricter legislation have
focused upon limiting disclosure of information to affiliated entities,
and upon requiring a customer's affirmative consent to disclose to
32 Kyle Thomas Sammin, Note, Any Port in a Storm: The Safe Harbor, The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, and the Problem of Privacy in Financial Services, 36 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
653,667 (2004) (providing examples on non-traditional financial institutions).
33 Trans Union L.L.C. v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42,48 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
34 FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 451,461-462 (D. Md. 2004).
35 Am. Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C, Cir. 2005).
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nonaffiliated entities." 36 The GLB Act seems to favor such laws. It
has a provision which states that the privacy protections of the GLB
Act "shall not be construed as superseding, altering, or affecting any
statute, regulation, order, or interpretation in effect in any State" if the
State statute is not inconsistent with the federal law.37 The GLB also
states that a provision is not inconsistent with the GLB if it provides
greater protection than that provided by the GLB Act.38 Even with
these specific provisions the courts have struggled with which state
laws are preempted by the GLB Act and other related privacy laws.
a. CALIFORNIA
Perhaps the best case study in the conflict between State law and
the GLB Act comes from California. The law involved is the 2003
California Financial Information Privacy Act (commonly know as
SB 1).39 It has spurred a line of cases that has recently reached the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
i. THE CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT (SB 1)
The California Financial Information Privacy Act was enacted on
July 1, 2004.40 The principal purpose of the California law is to
further restrict financial institutions' use of consumers' nonpublic
personal information.4 1 "SB1 deals with the sharing of nonpublic
information by affiliates of financial institutions, as well as by
unaffiliated third parties with which these institutions may choose to
do business. ' '42 The main difference between this law and the federal
provisions is that it uses an "opt-in" provision instead of an "opt-
36 Wolf, supra note 13, at 772.
" 15 U.S.C. § 6807(a) (2000).
38 Id. § 6807(b).
39 See CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4050-4060 (West 2004).
40 CAL. FIN. CODE § 4060 (West 2004).
41 Jason Shroff, California: A Privacy Statute Meets the GLBA & FCRA, 9 N.C. BANKING
INST. 223,223 (2005).
42 Id.
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out."43  Under SB1 financial institutions cannot share nonpublic
personal information with nonaffiliated third parties unless the
consumer allows the financial institution to do so by "opting in" to the
program. 44 The California law also prevents sharing among affiliates
unless the consumer is given an opportunity to "opt-out. 4 5 In passing
this law, the California legislature intended to provide consumers with
more protection than was available under the GLB Act.
46
ii. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION
The issue of whether SB 1 was preempted by federal law was first
tackled by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California.4 7 In the 2004, case of Am. Bankers Ass n v.-Lockyer, three
financial services trade associations brought an action that asked the
court to declare the affiliate sharing provision of SB1 void and
unenforceable because they believed that it was preempted by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.48 The primary issue in the case was "whether
the California Financial Information Privacy Act (SB1) could require
certain financial institution disclosures regarding privacy policies and
that customers be given optional participation rights with regard to
those information sharing policies." 49 For a variety of reasons the
court refused to rule that the law was preempted.
The trial court in this case, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California, granted summary judgment on behalf of
Lockyer.50 The court said that the American Bankers Association had
failed to show that SBl was expressly preempted. 51 The court could
43 Wolf, supra note 13, at 773.
44 Shroff, supra note 41, at 223-224.
45 Id.
46 CAL. FN. CODE § 4051 (West 2004).
47 Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, No. Civ. S 04-0778 MCE KJM, 2004 WL 1490432 (E.D.
Cal. June 30, 2004).
41Id. at *1.
49 Shroff, supra note 41, at 230.
"oAm. Bankers Ass'n, 2004 WL 1490432, at *1.
"' Id. at *6.
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also find no inference of preemption by federal regulation in the area.52
The court used a narrow construction when reading the preemption
clause of the FCRA. From this reading, the court concluded that the
preemption clause of the FCRA was not applicable to SB1. 53 Because
the preemption clause of the FCRA did not apply, SB 1 was not
preempted. 4 The court also held that the GLB Act expressly allowed
for laws like SB 1 to be passed by the states, and the GLB Act allows
the states to pass more restrictive laws on the sharing of such
information generally.55 This decision was immediatelr appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
This decision had very different potential consequences for
individual consumers and the banking industry. 57 "The main benefit to
individual consumers and states as a result of Lockyer is more control
over the sharing of financial information." 58 One criticism of the
decision is that it establishes "a national banking industry which also
allow[s] states to provide a patched framework of privacy rules to
which these banks were required to comply."59 According to Jason
Shroffs article, California: A Privacy Statute Meets the GLBA &
FCRA, such a framework is what Congress meant to prevent by
enacting federal legislation.60  The decision would also have led to
"banks in different states [being] on different playing fields" and
added to the costs of compliance.
52 Id. at *5.
" Id. at *4.
54 Id. at *6.
55 Id.
56 Roach & Schuerman, supra note 3, at 401.
57 Shroff, supra note 41, at 236-237.
581 d. at 237.
591Id. at 241.
60 Id.
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iii. THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPEAL
On December 6, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit heard the appeal of Am. Bankers Ass 'n v. Lockyer as Am.
Bankers Ass n v. Gould. It issued its decision on June 20, 2005.63
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit saw the case
very differently than the trial court. This led the Ninth Circuit to
reverse the lower court and rule that the California Financial
Information Privacy Act was preempted by federal law.
64
The Ninth Circuit opinion issued by Judge William A. Fletcher
stated the issue on appeal as follows:
[W]hether the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA")
preempts the California Financial Information Privacy Act
(commonly known as "SBI") insofar as it regulates the
exchange of information among financial institutions and
their affiliates.65
On appeal, the associations that brought suit argued that the district
court's grant of summary judgment was improper and again argued
"that SBI's opt-out provisions for affiliate information sharing are
preempted by the FCRA, and allege that they would suffer irreparable
injury if SB 1 were enforced against them." 66
In analyzing this case, the court examined two subparts. The first
involved the scope of the FCRA's Affiliate Sharing Preemption
Clause.67 The court started its interpretation of the affiliate sharing
provision of the FCRA, § 1681t(b)(2) "with the premise that 'the
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme."' 68 The court also applied the
62 Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2005).
63 Id.
64Id. at 1083.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1085.
671d. at 1086.
68Am. Bankers Ass 'n, 412 F.3d at 1086 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
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principle that the "goal in interpreting a statute is to understand the
statute 'as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme' and to 'fit,
if possible, all parts into a... harmonious whole." 69 Applying these
principles the court "constru[ed] the affiliate-sharing preemption
clause to preempt all state 'requirement[s]' and 'prohibition[s]' on the
communication of 'information' between affiliated parties."
70
However, the court then turned to the meaning of "information" as
used in the Act. The court interpreted the term "information" in the
FCRA preemption clause to be the same as the "the information
described in the definition of a 'consumer report' contained in §
1681 a(d)(1)."71 Using this interpretation the court held:
[T]hat the affiliate-sharing preemption clause preempts SB1
insofar as it attempts to regulate the communication between
affiliates of "information," as that term is used in §
1681a(d)(1). That is, SB1 is preempted to the extent that it
applies to information shared between affiliates concerning
consumers' "credit worthiness, credit standing, credit
capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living" that is used, expected to
be used, or collected for the purpose of establishing
eligibility for "credit or insurance," employment or other
authorized purpose.72
The court then remanded the case to determine whether under this
interpretation of "information" any3 portion of the affiliate sharing
provision could survive preemption.
The second issue the court examined was the applicability of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.74 The court noted that the GLB Act has
language that states that it shall not be construed "to modify, limit, or
69 Id.
70Id. at 1086 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(2)).
71 Id. at 1087.
72 id.
73 Id.
74 Am. Bankers Ass'n, 412 F.3d at 1087.
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supersede the operation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act."75 The court
therefore concluded that the GLB Act did not affect the preemptive
scope of the FCRA.76 Therefore, the court found that the GLB Act
was irrelevant in this case. 77
It appears that many of the concerns about the Lockyer case
undermining congressional intent have been put to rest. Lockyer is no
longer good law, and the preemptive power of the federal legislation in
areas where Congress wanted a federal statutory scheme seems to have
been restored. In terms of the GLB Act, Gould stands for the
proposition that the GLB Act does not affect the preemptive scope of
the FCRA.78 This is important because the FCRA and the GLB Act
often interact. That leaves the question, what became of SB1 on
remand?
iv. THE CASE ON REMAND: THE CURRENT STATE OF SB 1
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued its ruling in the remand of Am. Bankers Ass'n v.
Gould on Oct. 5, 2005. 79 The issue the court addressed on remand was
"whether any part of SBI's affiliate sharing provision survives
preemption and, if so can that surviving portion be severed from the
remainder of SB1? '8 The court found that in fact no portion of the
provision could survive preemption and "even if some limited
applications could be saved, they cannot be severed from the
remainder of the statute."81
Using the Ninth Circuit's defimition of "information," the court in
this case found that because the same "information" could be gathered
for both FCRA authorized and unauthorized purposes:
" Id. at 1087-88 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6806).
76 1d. at 1088.
77 id.
78 Id.
79 Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, No. S04-0778MCE KJM, 2005 WL 2452798, *1 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 5, 2005).
80ld. at*1.
81 id.
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Imposing SB I's requirements on the collection or use of this
dual purpose information necessarily violates FCRA's
preemption clause because California would be imposing a
requirement with respect to the exchange of information
among affiliates as expressly prohibited by the FCRA.
82
Because of this reading, the court ruled that no portion of the affiliate
sharing provision of SB1 could stand.83 Finally, the court ruled that it
could not sever any portion of SBl were it to survive preemption.
This is because the defendants were asking the court "to 'dissect an
unconstitutional measure and reframe a valid one out of it by inserting
limitations it does not contain. This is legislative work beyond the
power and function of the court."' 84 The court, therefore, could not
sever any portion of SB 1 even if it were to survive preemption. This
means that as of now the affiliate sharing provision of SB 1 is
preempted and no portion of it survives.
b. OTHER STATES
State law preemption issues have also been tackled by courts in
Massachusetts and Vermont. 6 The Massachusetts case arose after
the Massachusetts Bankers Association, Inc. ("MBA") asked the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") to issue an opinion
as to whether the GLB Act preempted certain provisions of the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act Relative to the Sale of
Insurance by Banks. 7 On March 18, 2002, the OCC responded and
opined that the provisions were preempted by federal law.88  The
12 Id. at *3.
83 Id. at *3 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 168t(b)(2)).
84 Id. at *4 (citing Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922)).
85 See Mass. Bankers Ass'n v. Bowler, 392 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D. Mass. 2005).
86 See Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Vt. Dep't of Banking, No. 50-1-02 Wncv, 2004 WL
578737 (Vt. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2004).
87 Mass. Bankers Ass 'n, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (discussing Mass. Consumer Protection Act
Relative to the Sale of Insurance by Banks, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167F, § 2A (West
2005)).
88 Id.
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Massachusetts Commissioners of Insurance and Banks and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought review in the First Circuit
Court of Appeals of the "regulatory conflict" resulting from the OCC
opinion.89 However, the First Circuit dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction as there was not a "regulatory conflict."
90
After this ruling was issued, the MBA and some Massachusetts
banks individually filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts. 91 The Plaintiffs challenged four
provisions of the Massachusetts law, which they labeled the Referral
Prohibition 92 the Referral Fee Prohibition,93 the Waiting Period
Restriction 9 4 and the Separation Restriction. 95  The Referral
Prohibition "allows officers, tellers, and other bank emplovees who are
not licensed insurance aents to refer a bank customer to a licensed
insurance aient only when the customer inquires about insurance.
96
The Referral Fee Prohibition "forbids banks from oaving their
employees for making the referrals to their insurance agents. '97 The
Waiting Period Restriction,
allows banks to solicit insurance sales to loan applicants only
after the application for the extension of credit is approved,
and such approval and required disclosures have been
communicated to and acknowledged by the applicant in
89 id.
90 Bowler v. Hawke, 320 F.3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2003).
91 Mass. Bankers Ass 'n, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
92 Mass. Consumer Protection Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167F, § 2A(b)(2) (West 2005),
invalidated by Mass. Bankers Ass'n v. Bowler, 392 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D. Mass. 2005).
93 Mass. Consumer Protection Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167F, § 2A(b)(2) (West 2005).
94 Id. § 2A(b)(4).
" Id. § 2A(b)(3); Mass. Bankers Ass 'n, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
96 Mass Bankers Ass 'n, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
97 Id.
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writing. The banks are required to retain the solicitation,
approval, and acknowledgment as a permanent record.98
Finally, the Senaration Restriction "reauires insurance solicitation to
be conducted in a physically separate area of the bank, with a few
exceptions." 99 The Bankers Association argued that the provisions
were preempted by the GLB Act, specifically 15 U.S.C. §
6701 (d)(2)(A).
The District court recognized that the GLB Act contains specific
language indicating that the Act is intended to preempt some state
laws.' The court saw the issue in the case to be "whether the
challenged provisions 'prevent or significantly interfere' with the
ability of banks to sell, solicit, or cross market insurance." 101  This
language came from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, where the
court gave a standard for examining "the preemptive scope of statutes
and regulations granting a power to national banks."' 12  The court
ruled that the Referral Prohibition and the Referral Fee Prohibition
were preempted because they significantly curtailed the bank's ability
to cross-market, solicit, and thereby sell insurance products. 10 3 The
Waiting Period Restriction was also preempted because it significantly
interfered with the banks' ability to solicit, cross-market and sell their
insurance products. Finally, the Separation Restriction was preempted
because it required plaintiffs to incur more costs, since they needed
more physical space to comply and, therefore, seriously impeded the
banks' ability to solicit, cross-market, and sell insurance products.
In 2001 in Vermont, the Department of Banking, Insurance,
Securities, and Healthcare Administration ("BISHCA") promulgated
Regulation 1H-2001-01, which created an "opt-in" provision for the
disclosure of nonpublic financial and health information by
98 Id.
99 Id.
100Id. at27 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1999)).
101 Id.
102 Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
1 03 Id. at 28.
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licensees, 104 which was similar to California's SB1 discussed above.
Five insurance trade organizations sought a court ruling that the
regulation fell outside the BISHCA's statutory authority and that it
violated constitutional provisions. 0 5 The court looked at the GLB Act
and found that the GLB's "opt-outf, 106 set a floor for consumer
protection, which superseded state law except where they provided
greater protections. 17 T he court then held that the Vermont
Regulation provided greater protection than the parallel GLB Act
provisions, and therefore it was not superseded and so was
enforceable. 10 8 In the second part of its ruling relevant to the validity
of "opt-in" provisions, the court ruled that such provisions do not
impermissibly burden the First Amendment right to free speech. 109 In
doing so, the court applied the four part test for commercial speech
from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pubic Service Comm. of
New York."l0 The court applied this test and found that an "opt-in"
provision passes this constitutional test. 
11
The case law on preemption to this point gives some mixed
messages on the preemption of tougher state laws when they conflict
with federal financial privacy statutes. The lower courts in Lockyer
and Am. Council of Life Insurers have issued rulings favorable to
stricter state laws. However, other courts, including the highest court
to rule on the subject, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have
interpreted the preemption clauses of the federal legislation in a way
more friendly to preemption by federal law. In fact, "opt-in"
provisions in general may be preempted, if other circuits follow the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Even if these
104 See Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Vt. Dep't of Banking, No. 50-1-02 Wncv, 2004 WL
578737, at *1 (Vt. Super. Feb. 12, 2004).
105 Id.
106 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b) (2000).
107 Am. Council of Life Insurers, 2004 WL 578737, at *2.
o Id. at *6-7.
109 Id. at *5.
11o Id. at *5 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pubic Service Comm. of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
11 Id. at *7.
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provisions are not directly preempted by the provisions of the GLB
Act, the FCRA as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in Gould, seems to
disallow them to the extent that any such provision:
[a]pplies to information shared between affiliates concerning
consumers' "credit worthiness, credit standing, credit
capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living" that is used, expected to
be used, or collected for the purpose of establishing
eligibility for "credit or insurance," employment or other
authorized purpose. 12
What is clear is that allowing stricter state statutes tends to be more
favorable to consumers looking for more privacy protections.
However, such laws also cause headaches for the financial services
industry and can cause an increase in the price of conducting business.
In addition, if these state laws are found not to be preempted by the
laws that make up the federal framework, Congress' intent to create a
uniform national system of privacy laws could be frustrated. This is
an area where the case law needs to be monitored closely in the future.
2. THE IMPACT OF THE GLB ACT ON DISCOVERY IN LITIGATION
Another area of the GLB Act that was litigated in 2005 was
whether it is a violation of the GLB Act for financial institutions to
disclose nonpublic personal information during the discovery process
in a court proceeding." 3 This issue had been addressed by the courts a
number of times before, but to this point there is no case that serves as
binding precedent in all jurisdictions.
In 2005, the Superior Court of Connecticut decided this issue in
McGuire v. Rawlings Co., L.L.C. In an opinion issued on March 14,
2005, the court ruled that the GLB Act does not prevent disclosure of
nonpublic personal information in the discovery process. 14 To reach
this conclusion, the Superior Court of Connecticut discussed the
decisions of the other courts around the country that had decided the
112 Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005).
113 See McGuire v. Rawlings Co., No. CV000375212S, 2005 WL 895870 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 14, 2005).
1141d. at *7.
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issue. In doing so, the court cited the Supreme Court of West Virginia
which had stated, "even if the GLBA included no exception for civil
discovery, the mere fact that a statute generally prohibits the disclosure
of certain information does not give parties to a civil dispute the right
to circumvent the discovery process." ' 115 Other courts have also held
that the GLB Act does not prevent disclosure.
A number of courts recognized a judicial process exception to the
GLB Act prior to 2005. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia recognized this exception in Marks
v. Global Mortgage Group, Inc.116 In so holding, the court stated that
because a party who is responding to a discovery request is responding
to judicial process, the party may disclose its customer's nonpublic
personal information. 117 In Ex parte Mutual Savings Life Insurance
Company, the Supreme Court of Alabama also recognized the judicial
process exception."l 8 The court found that there was a congressionally
created exception for situations where, "the trial court orders the
disclosure of a customer's nonpublic personal information during
discovery in a civil action." 119 However, the court did create a
safeguard when it stated that courts "should also issue a
comprehensive protective order to guard the customers' privacy." 120
The final court that has recognized the judicial process exception is the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The West Virginia court
recognized the exception in Martino v. Barnett.12 1 In that case, the
court held that nonpublic personal information can be disclosed under
the exceptions to the GLB Act, when tempered by judicial
involvement that protects the customers during the discovery
process.122 The majority of jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue
have recognized the judicial process exemption to the GLB Act.
115 Marks v. Global Mgmt Group, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 492, 496 (S.D. W.Va. 2003).
116 id.
"
7 Id. at 492.
I18 Exparte Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 986, 992 (Ala. 2004).
119 Id
'
2 Id. at 993.
121 Martino v. Barnett, 215 W.Va. 123 (2004).
112 Id. at 131.
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At least one court has ruled that the GLB Act does in fact prevent
disclosure of nonpublic personal information in the discovery
process. 2 3 In United Planters Bank, N.A. v. Gavel, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted a
permanent injunction against disclosure on the grounds that:
The GLBA is written with the protection of the customers of
the financial institutions in mind. This protection continues
in all aspects of the GLBA. Such protection can be seen
when financial institutions are allowed to provide nonpublic
personal information to nonaffiliated third parties,
whereupon the nonaffiliated third party must maintain
confidentiality. 124
Where does this leave the judicial process exception? The
majority of jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue have recognized a
judicial process exception to the GLB Act. It is important to
remember that even the courts that have allowed the disclosure of this
information have provided judicially created privacy protections.
There are still a few jurisdictions that have refused to allow an
exception for discovery. This means that one must pay close attention
to the rule of the jurisdiction in which they are practicing when
attempting to invoke this exception.
3. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE GLB ACT?
The final major issue the courts considered in 2005 involving the
GLB Act involved whether or not the GLB Act creates a private right
of action. This issue had been addressed a number of times before by
the courts. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas
followed the precedent set by other courts and ruled that the GLB Act
does not provide a private right of action.1
25
123 See Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Gavel, Civ. A. 02-1224, 2003 WL 1193671 (E.D. La.
Mar. 11, 2003) (vacated on other grounds by Union Planters Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Salih, 369
F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2004)).
124 Id. at *9.
125 See Briggs v. Emporia State Bank and Trust Co., No. 05-2125-JWL, 2005 WL 2035038
(D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2005).
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In 2003, in the case of Menton v. Experian Corp., the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that 15
U.S.C. § 6805(a) did not provide for a private right of action because it
limited the GLB Act to government action. 126 Then in 2004, two more
rulings were issued that held that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act "does
not provide a private right of action for a financialprivacy institution's
violation of the [GLB Act's] privacy provisions. '" l The court in both
Borinski v. Williamson and Lacerte Software Corp. v. Profession Tax
Services, L.L.C. cited the Menton decision as authority in reaching
their conclusions.
In 2005, in the case of Briggs v. Emporia State Bank and Trust
Co., the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
followed suit and ruled that there is no private right of action under the
GLB Act. 128 Specifically, the court said that the GLB Act does not
expressly provide for a private right of action. 2 9 The court found that
Congress did not mean to imply a private right of action. 30 The court
therefore, concluded that there could be no private right of action.
13
No court to date has been willing to find a private right of action under
the GLB Act.
C. PENDING LEGISLATION
A number of bills introduced before Congress in 2005 could
potentially affect the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. These include four
bills currently pending before the House of Representatives 132 and
126 Menton v. Experian Corp., No. 02 Civ. 4687 (NRB), 2003 WL 21692820, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
July 21, 2003).
127 Borninski v. Williamson, No. Civ. A. 3:02-CV-1014, 2004 WL 433746, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 1, 2004); see also Lacerte Software Corp. v. Prof'I Tax Serv., L.L.C., No. Civ. 3:03-CV-
1551-H (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2004).
121 Briggs, 2005 WL 2035038, at *2-3.
129 Id. at *2.
130 Id. at *3.
t31 Id.
132 See Community Banks Serving Their Communities First Act, H.R. 2061, 109th Cong. §
203 (1st Sess. 2005); Privacy Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2387, 109th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess.
2005); Consumer Data Security and Notification Act of 2005, H.R. 3140, 109th Cong. § 3 (1st
20061
1/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
three Senate bills.133 These bills vary in importance and likelihood of
passage, but all must be monitored closely.
1. THE FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT OF 2005
Of all the pieces of financial privacy legislation currently pending
before Congress, perhaps the most important is the Financial Privacy
Act of 2005, also known as S. 116.134 S. 116 was proposed by Senator
Dianne Feinstein on January 24, 2005.13' The bill was introduced to
change the fact that the GLB Act does not draw a distinction between
the sale of information to an affiliated entity and the mere sharing of
information. 36  The bill's purpose is to "require the consent of an
individual prior to the sale and marketing of such individual's
personally identifiable information.' ' 137 A second provision of the bill
would change the GLB Act's "opt-out" provision to an "opt-in"
provision like that which California attempted to implement in SB1
discussed above.'3 8 If passed, this bill will bring about major changes
in how the GLB Act operates.
Il. CONCLUSION
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is a comprehensive and complicated
piece of financial privacy legislation. It is also relatively new. This
means that all of the wrinkles of its enforcement have yet to be ironed
out. There were a number of developments involving the law in 2005.
A number of GLB Act issues were brought to the courts for
interpretation in 2005. The most visible cases involved state law
Sess. 2005); Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2005, H.R. 3505, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005).
133 Privacy Act of 2005, S. 116, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); Safeguarding Americans From
Exporting Identification Data Act, S. 810, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); Communities First
Act, S. 1568, 109th Cong. § 203 (1st Session 2005).
134 See Privacy Act of 2005, S. 116, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
135 Wolf, supra note 13, at 775.
136 id.
137 Privacy Act of 2005, S. 116, 109th Cong. (Ist Sess. 2005).
138 Wolf, supra note 13, at 775.
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preemption, the judicial process exemption, and whether a private
right of action exists under the GLB. Some of these rulings brought
significant changes and others followed previous precedent. These
areas will have to be watched for any further changes in the future.
In addition to the changes arising through judicial interpretation,
the GLB Act may also be changing through legislative amendment. S.
116 is currently the most important piece of legislation pending
involving the GLB Act. However, practitioners must also be prepared
for other legislative changes.
A number of developments involving the GLB Act occurred in
2005, and it is likely that there will be more in the future. The GLB
Act is subject to change through judicial interpretation, legislative
amendment, and changes in enforcement decisions made by
government agencies. As a result, those who are affected by the
provisions of the GLB Act must be especially vigilant and continue to
watch for any such changes.

